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“America must remain American”: 
The Liberal Contribution to Race Restrictions 
in the 1924 Immigration Act
Kevin Yuill
America must remain American,” President Calvin Coolidge said in 1924 as he signed into law a measure that ended a period of nearly unrestricted 
immigration into the United States. The importance of the 1924 Immigration 
Act—sometimes referred to as the Johnson-Reed, National Origins, or Japanese 
Exclusion Act—is well known. But the story of how it highlighted race as an 
important identifier of Americanness is less well understood, though many 
appreciate its significance. Not only did this first permanent act restricting 
immigration determine how many arrived, it created, as Coolidge hinted, a racial 
narrative through which the genius of the country, the strength of its people, and 
its history and its accomplishments were understood. The 1924 restrictions on 
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The anti-Japanese clause in the 1924 Immigration Act was ultimately more important than its 
discriminatory quotas on Eastern and Southern Europeans.
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immigration clarified and strengthened the racial requirements for citizenship 
embedded in naturalization statutes since 1790.
This article has a dual purpose. First, it reviews the history of the 1924 act, 
discussing the story of its passage and the dramatis personae who ensured its 
passage, and relates it to previous legislative attempts at immigration restriction. 
Second, it indicates how the act’s passage was less a triumph for those demanding 
restrictions upon Eastern and Southern Europeans and more a reformulation of 
American identity as racially European. The passage of the act may have been 
viewed at the time as the “Nordic Victory” famously trumpeted by the Los Angeles 
Times, 1 but ultimately, the act defined Eastern and Southern Europeans as at 
least potentially American. Though some Europeans may have been, according 
to the act, lower than Nordics on the racial ladder, the Japanese—and all others 
deemed as Asian—were permanently barred from being American.
The contribution of those whom we can call liberals, who rejected the extreme 
immigration restrictions and regional differentiation among Europeans, is often 
missed by historians. That is partially because after the First World War elites 
throughout Europe and the United States were reticent about asserting their “race 
superiority.” Instead, they preferred to discuss the need for “racial homogeneity” 
within national borders. 2 
One of the attributes of expressions of white identity, like that in Lothrop 
Stoddard’s very popular 1920 book, The Rising Tide of Color Against White 
World-Supremacy, was extraordinary claims of superiority alongside a profound 
sense of vulnerability. Whereas Stoddard issued a call to arms to the “superior” 
whites, others worried that outnumbered whites would lose the race war they 
felt was inevitable. “Inferior” races had, they felt, been inspired by Japan’s victory 
over Russia and white discord during the Great War. British author J. H. Curle, 
in a book published in the United States as Our Testing Time: Will the White Race 
1 “Nordic Victory is Seen in Dramatic Restrictions” Los Angeles Times, April 13, 1924. See John 
Higham’s seminal Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism 1860–1925 (New York: 
Atheneum, 1973, ©1955), 300.
2 For the concept of race being removed from polite discussion, see Frank Furedi, The Silent War: 
Imperialism and Changing Perception of Race (London: Pluto Press, 1998). Alistair Bonnett has 
described the growing tendency for the most internationally minded Britons in the interwar period to 
replace “white civilization” with “Western Civilization,” which no doubt was replicated in the United 
States. “From White to Western: ‘Racial Decline’ and the Idea of the West in Britain, 1890–1930,” 
Journal of Historical Sociology 16, No. 3 (2003): 320–48.
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Win Through? in 1926, predicted: “Every coloured people, in its own particular 
way, will attempt to throw off white domination.” 3 Many educated Americans 
began advocating a more diplomatic approach, particularly toward the most 
powerful and presumed leader of the “colored” nations:  Japan. Sociologist 
Emory Bogardus explained the development of the Survey of Race Relations 4 in 
1923, headed by his mentor, pioneering race relations expert Robert Ezra Park: 
While a number of Americans were openly expressing their prejudice against 
the Orientals, there were other Americans who felt that the Japanese were 
being unjustifiably insulted. While these “fair-play” Americans did not want the 
Pacific Coast “to be overrun by the Japanese,” they felt that there was a better 
method of solving the problem than by heaping abuse upon the newcomers. 5 
As Ellsworth Farris, a sociologist at the University of Chicago, wrote: “Every 
sociologist knows that intolerance and ill-natured opposition produces resistance.” 6
Besides the need for diplomacy, fear of a coming race war led many to attack the 
emphasis on Nordics and Nordicism as detrimental to white solidarity. Such a 
concern led Sir Leo Chiozza Money, one-time Liberal MP and cabinet minister, to 
criticize Stoddard for his focus upon intra-white racial differences (Money referred 
to the “Nordiculous theory”). “[I]t is suicidal,” he said, “to encourage racial scorns, 
racial suspicions, racial hatreds amongst the small minority that stands for White 
civilisation.” 7 As this article demonstrates, American liberals acted in accord 
with both these perspectives when they ensured the passage of some of the most 
3  The citation is from the British version of the book: J. H. Curle, To-day and To-Morrow: The Testing 
Period of the White Race (London: Methuen and Co, Ltd, 1926), 204. Curle wrote: “Through scorn of 
wisdom, and experience, we have brought about something like chaos in our white affairs,” calling 
this period the “zenith” of the white race while simultaneously warning of the “disintegrating realities” 
facing whites.
4 Organized in 1921 by the Institute of Social and Religious Research (1921–1934), the Survey of 
Race Relations on the Pacific Coast was funded by East Coast liberal Protestant organizations with 
the mission to be “the first unpartisan, scientific survey of the Oriental situation on the Pacific Coast.” 
(Eckard Toy, “Whose Frontier? The Survey of Race Relations on the Pacific Coast in the 1920s,” Oregon 
Historical Quarterly 107, No. 1 (Spring 2006), 36–63, 37.
5 The fact that Park turned down a role in the investigation into the 1919 Chicago race riot so 
he could investigate race relations on the Pacific coast gives an indication of where he thought the 
real problem was. Emory S. Bogardus, “Cooperative Research on the Pacific Coast,” The Journal of 
Educational Sociology 4, No. 9, The Research Number (May 1931): 563–68.
6 Ellsworth Faris, “The Verbal Battle of the Races,” Social Service Review 3, No. 1 (March 1929): 19–29.
7  Sir Leo Chiozza Money, The Peril of the White (London: W. Collins and Co., 1925), 149; cf Bonnett, 
“From White to Western,” 324.
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egregiously racist federal legislation of the 20th century. They made the Pacific, in 
the words of Park, “our racial frontier.” 8 
The majority of historians focus upon the contribution of ardent racialists to the 
passage of the 1924 Immigration Act. As Roger Daniels notes, “Both extreme and 
moderate restrictionists won some victories, but overall the extremists appeared 
to have the upper hand.” 9 Some scholars have pointed to the contribution of the 
center ground to the passage of the 1924 act. 10 Daniels and others, like Erica Lee, for 
instance, argue that the racism embedded in the 1924 Immigration Act is best seen 
as an extension of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. 11 But, as Mae Ngai notes about 
8  “It is as if we have said: Europe, of which after all America is a mere western projection, ends here. 
The Pacific Coast is our racial frontier.” Robert Ezra Park, “Our Racial Frontier on the Pacific,” Race and 
Culture (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1950), 138–51, 139.
9  Roger Daniels and Otis L. Graham, Debating American Immigration, 1882–Present (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 20. See also Roger Daniels, Not Like Us: Immigrants and Minorities in America, 
1890–1924 (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1997), and The Politics of Prejudice: The Anti-Japanese Movement in 
California and the Struggle for Japanese Exclusion (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1963). John 
Higham’s still excellent Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism 1860–1925 (New York: Atheneum, 
1973, ©1955) set the pattern by identifying “nativism”—a populist antagonism towards newcomers that can be 
tapped into by unscrupulous politicians—as ultimately responsible for the 1924 act, though his well-balanced 
account also identifies racism as separate from nativism. Brian Gratton goes much further by questioning 
whether figures such as Henry Cabot Lodge and the Immigration Restriction League acted out of racial 
thinking or simply political opportunism in “Race or Politics? Henry Cabot Lodge and the Origins of the 
Immigration Restriction Movement in the United States,” Journal of Policy History 30, Issue 1 (January 2018): 
128–57. Desmond S. King and Rogers M. Smith divide “racial institutional orders” into a “white supremacist” 
order and an “egalitarian transformative” order in their “Racial Orders in American Political Development,” 
American Political Science Review 99, No. 1 (February 2005): 75–92, though the “egalitarian transformative” 
order can hardly be said to exist in the 1920s. 
10 Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p.88, notes: “Although it may be tempting in retrospect 
to identify the likes of Madison Grant, Lothrop Stoddard, Harry Laughlin, and Albert Johnson as extreme 
in their views, it is critical to recognize that figures far more central to American political and intellectual life 
shared many of their basic assumptions—Theodore Roosevelt, Calvin Coolidge, Edward A. Ross, Frederick 
Jackson Turner, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Charlotte Perkins Gilman are among them.”
11  Erica Lee, At America’s Gates: Chinese Immigration during the Exclusion Era, 1882–1943 (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2003). See also Najia Aarim-Heriot, Chinese Immigrants, African Americans, 
and Racial Anxiety in the United States, 1848–82 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006), who argues that the 
experience of the Chinese must be integrated into the history of immigration restriction. Ronald Takaki wrote 
that racism pre-existed the Chinese in America: “What enabled businessmen to degrade the Chinese into a 
subservient labouring caste was the dominant ideology that defined America as a racially homogenous society 
and Americans as white. The status of racial inferiority assigned to the Chinese had been prefigured in the black 
and Indian past.” Ronald Takaki, A Different Mirror: A History of Multicultural America. (New York: Back Bay 
Books, 1993), 204. Alexander Saxton traced the roots of anti-Chinese sentiment to working-class ideology of 
the Jacksonian era, seeing it as a permanent feature of the country. See Alexander Saxton, The Indispensable 
Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 
1975), and Gwendolyn Mink, Old Labor and New Immigrants in American Political Development: Union, Party, 
and State, 1875–1920 (London: Cornell University Press, 1986).
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the historiography, “placing the eugenics movement in the foreground of the story of 
the Johnson-Reed Act has obscured from view other racial constructions that took 
place in the formulation of immigration restriction.” 12
This study focuses on those who identified themselves as liberals, building upon, among 
others, the scholarship of Ngai, Gary Gerstle, Thomas C. Leonard, and Daniel Tichenor. 13 
This article goes further, however, in arguing that the drive toward racial categories in 
1924 was “top-down.” Liberals did more than passively accept racial categories—they 
actively argued for them instead of the blanket ban on immigration called for by 
trade unions. They fashioned crude regional prejudices into a comprehensive racial 
nationalism. Rather than a victory for Nordic extremists, the act is best seen as the 
triumph of racial liberals. It shows that Albert Johnson, Republican representative 
from Washington, crude racialist, anti-Semite, and sponsor of the legislation that bears 
his name, was ultimately less important than his Senate partner, the suave, liberal 
Republican David Reed, who balked at the racial triumphalism of the time. Despite 
Reed’s comparative liberalism and internationalist outlook, his contribution broke the 
deadlock between pro- and anti-immigration forces. Though Reed at first rejected 
the Japanese exclusion clause for fear of insulting Japan, he and other senators took 
advantage of a misstep by the Japanese ambassador to vote it through. For more than 40 
years, thanks to the efforts of Reed and other liberal supporters of immigration controls, 
race became the most important foundation of American citizenship.  
The Immigration Acts Leading up to the 1924 Immigration Act
The 1924 Immigration, or National Origins, or Johnson-Reed Act, followed 
briskly upon two previous immigration restriction acts passed in 1917 and 1921. 
Neither used race as justification for restricting immigrants. The 1917 Burnett 
bill, as passed by the House, contained a clause barring “Hindus and persons 
12  Mae Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press), 24. 
13  Gary Gerstle noted: “These liberals and others, I contend, were the most influential architects of 
the twentieth–century nation. They were committed to the civic nationalist tradition in general and to 
equal rights for ethnic and racial minorities in particular. But many of them periodically reinscribed 
racialist notions into their rhetoric and policies.” American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth 
Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 88. David Cook-Martín and David FitzGerald, 
in “Liberalism and the Limits of Inclusion: Race and Immigration Law in the Americas, 1850–2000, 
Journal of Interdisciplinary History 41, No. 1 (Summer 2010): 7–25, challenge the received wisdom 
that politically liberal regimes are inherently incompatible with legal discrimination based on race. 
Thomas C. Leonard, Illiberal Reformers: Race, Eugenics & American Economics in the Progressive Era 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016) implicates Progressivism in the racial politics of the 
1920s. Daniel J. Tichenor. Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002) emphasizes the contribution of policymakers, technocrats, and 
bureaucrats to immigration restriction.
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who cannot become eligible, under existing law, to become citizens of the United 
States by naturalization, unless otherwise provided for by existing agreement as 
to passports, or by existing treaties.” Despite the fact that Japanese would not be 
barred because of the “existing treaties” clause, Japan protested, whereupon the 
Senate amended the Burnett bill by simply removing the offending clauses. 14
Though those noisily pushing a racial agenda certainly made their presence 
known, 15 racial theories had yet to dominate Congress or the country. In the House, 
Albert Johnson argued: “If we are to restrict at all, we must have some method. The 
percentage restriction will not do for it will admit liberal numbers of all the oriental 
races, races with which we can not assimilate, and which most of us agree should 
not be permitted to secure a further foothold in the States of this Union.” 16 In the 
Senate, James A. Reed of Missouri protested that the amended bill was constructed 
arbitrarily: “The committee undertook for the first time to exclude people from 
entering this country by lines of latitude and longitude, not by races, not by 
intellectual qualifications, not by moral attribute, but by arbitrary lines.” 17 
Some in 1917 had undoubtedly been influenced by Madison Grant’s Passing of 
the Great Race. The book divided races into European, African, Mongoloid, 
Aboriginal American, and Australasian, with the European “race” further divided. 
The superior Nordic (or Baltic) race, “domineering, individualistic, self-reliant 
and jealous of their personal freedom both in political and religious systems,” 
contrasted with a Mediterranean race, intellectually gifted but physically and 
morally inferior to Nordics, and the Alpine race, “always and everywhere a race of 
peasants.” 18 Although the book was influential in the 1920s, its initial reception in 
1916 was lukewarm, as Jonathan Spiro has pointed out. 19
The language employed in 1917 indicates the confusion the idea of “race” still created; 
eugenics based on preventing “low-grade” births in America vied with restrictions 
14  Cited in Kenzi Ogomori, “The Ground of Japan’s Displeasure: An Official Statement of the Racial 
Discrimination Perceived in the Burnett Immigration Bill.” New York Times, May 16, 1916.
15  Representative Everis Hayes of California, noted Japan’s protest but insisted that “this bill does 
not change existing conditions in reference to any Asiatic who comes or has been coming to the United 
States except the Hindu.” Congressional Record, 64th Cong., Vol. 53, Part 5, March 24, 4784.
16  Congressional Record, 64th Cong., Vol. 53, Part 5, March 24, 4785.  
17  Congressional Record, 64th Cong., February 5, 1917, Senate, 2618.
18  Madison Grant, The Passing of the Great Race; or, The Racial Basis of European History, 4th rev. ed. 
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1936), xxviii, 51–52, 227, 228.
19  Jonathan Spiro, Defending the Master Race: Conservation, Eugenics, and the Legacy of Madison 
Grant (Burlington, VT: University of Vermont Press, 2009), 14.
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based on national origins. 20 As James Reed pointed out, though the legislation 
established an “Asiatic barred zone” that prevented immigration from most countries 
of the Asian subcontinent, Japan and much of China were not included in the barred 
zone, so its basis was not wholly racial. The bill presented, at best, a partial victory 
for the Immigration Restriction League (IRL), formed in 1894 by three Harvard 
graduates to lobby for selective racial restrictions. In 1917 generalized restriction 
failed to privilege “Anglo-Saxon” immigration. The statute does not mention race 
per se—though the Asiatic barred zone certainly suggests the presence of racial 
issues. 21 Instead, it focused on an attempt to filter the “physically, the mentally, and 
the morally unfit” from immigrating to the United States. 22 Western and southern 
representatives, won over to racial restrictions because of their own regional 
concerns, argued vociferously for the bill in Congress. But most of the discussion 
on Capitol Hill concerned fear of hordes from Europe, bringing with them their 
tribal hatreds onto the streets of the United States. Labor consistently supported 
immigration restriction for fear that competition would drive down wages. Racial 
concerns, though present, hardly figured. 
In 1921 fear of political infection after the Bolshevik Revolution and a postwar 
influx of labor from Europe—rather than the need to preserve the racial makeup 
of the United States—spurred the passage of the Emergency Quota Act of 1921, 
or EQA. Its quotas were based on the last available census of 1910 rather than 
the census of 1890, as was the later 1924 act. In the shadow of the Red Scare of 
1919, and with turmoil in Europe dominating the news, the bill passed the House 
without a recorded vote and sailed through the Senate, 78–1. 23 
20 Some argue that the restrictions on Asian Indians imposed in 1917 reflected racial sentiments. 
Though there was undeniably prejudice involved, the comprehensive racially demarcated lines 
between Europe and elsewhere were not present in 1917. Even on the west coast, the Asiatic Exclusion 
League, which called attention to the “menace” of Indian labor and had long campaigned against 
Japanese immigration, warned, in the face of statistics showing that very few “Hindu” laborers entered 
the country, that “Japanese and Italian (emphasis mine) immigration had mushroomed from similar 
modest beginnings.” Gary R. Hess, “The ‘Hindu’ in America: Immigration and Naturalization Policies 
and India, 1917–1946,” Pacific Historical Review 38, No. 1 (1969): 59–79.
21 The original House bill—the Burnett bill—contained a section that called for all Japanese and 
Chinese immigrants to be registered, provoking protests by the Japanese government in particular. See 
“Orientals Here Protest: Immigration Bill Causes Concern to Their Diplomats,” New York Times, February 
8, 1916, 3. In May 1916 the Senate Committee on Immigration introduced an elaborate amendment to 
the House bill that excluded Japan from the Asiatic barred zone and omitted the registration.
22  Cited by John L. Cable, speaking on HR7995, February 26, 1924, 68th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional 
Record, pt, 4–6: 3166.
23 Debate on Immigration, Congressional Record, 67th Congress, Vol. 61, Part 1, Senate, May 
3, 1921, 968. See also Roger Daniels, Guarding the Golden Door: American Immigration Policy and 
Immigrants Since 1882 (New York: Hill & Wang, 2004).
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The 1924 act, as passed, preserved the Immigration Act of 1917 and replaced the 
EQA of 1921, retaining its quota formulation. Under the EQA, an annual quota of 
three percent of the foreign-born of each nationality present in 1910—with total 
immigration no more than 357,803—was allotted to Europe, Africa, Australia, and 
those parts of Asia not barred by the 1917 act. The 1924 act replaced the three 
percent quota with two percent, and most significantly, based the percentage on 
the national origins of Americans according to the 1890 census, rather than the 
censuses of 1920 or 1910 (the 1900 census omitted information about national 
origins). In this emphasis, it was blatantly discriminatory and racist, identifying 
immigration before 1890—generally from northern and western Europe—as 
more American than those nationalities from southern and eastern Europe that 
made up the majority of immigration from 1890 and the years after. 24
The passage of the 1924 Immigration Act became imperative before the date the 
Emergency Quota Act expired on June 30, 1924. Besides the restrictions, the 
1924 act set up, sensibly, a system whereby visas would be obtained by American 
consuls abroad rather than having immigrants turned back at their port of entry 
to the United States. 25 The 1924 act, as it was finally passed in the Senate, was 
to be revised after three years (which became five years after a delay) in order 
to give the Presidential Commission of the Secretaries of State and Commerce 
and the attorney general—which in turn employed a panel of six demographers 
and statistical experts—time to calculate quotas on a national-origins base. Until 
then, the quotas were to be equal to two percent of the foreign-born who were 
residents in the United States as determined by the census of 1890. The experts, 
faced with great difficulties, took until 1929 to complete their task. After July 1, 
1927, the legislation promised, the quotas “shall be a number which bears the same 
ratio to 150,000 as the number of inhabitants in continental United States in 1920 
having that national origin.” 26 However, it was 1929 before the national origins of 
Americans in 1920 could be satisfactorily calculated.
The way the legislation eventually worked can be demonstrated with relation to 
those of British origin. From the U.S. population in 1920 of approximately 110 
million people, those of British origin were calculated at 48,195,400. The ratio of 
24  Debate on restriction of immigration, Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 65, Part 
6, April 2, 1924, 5412. 
25  See Marion T. Bennett, American Immigration Policies: A History (Washington, DC: Public Affairs 
Press, 1963), 51.
26   No author: “Outstanding Features of the Immigration Act of 1924,” Columbia Law Review 25, No. 1 
(January 1925): 90–95.
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the British share over total population, .43814, is multiplied by 150,000 to give the 
quota for those of British origin:  65,721. However, those from countries not given a 
quota were effectively banned in perpetuity from becoming American citizens. This 
changed the status of the Japanese and Chinese. Under the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 
1907–08, Japan had pledged to prevent laborers from Japan emigrating to the United 
States; the clause in the 1924 legislation unilaterally prevented them from entering as 
immigrants. Under the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882—made permanent in 1902—
only Chinese laborers were excluded. In 1924 all Asians were deemed unassimilable 
and therefore prohibited from immigrating to the United States. 
There were no restrictions on immigrants from the western hemisphere—
immigration from Mexico, Brazil, or Canada, for instance. However, immigration 
from colonial possessions in the western hemisphere—mostly the West Indies—
was charged to the quota of the mother country, effectively slowing black 
immigration to the United States. Only Canada, Newfoundland, and the Canal 
Zone were made exceptions. Asians from the Philippines, then a U.S. colony, 
were exempt from quotas, providing an argument that the racial provisions in 
the act were not complete (though they would later be excluded during Franklin 
Roosevelt’s government). 27 
The calculations were made only from the white population, which was divided 
into “colonial stock”— people whose ancestors came to America before 1790—and 
postcolonial stock, those who came to the United States after 1790. One of the 
more racially charged aspects of their 1920 population survey was their specific 
exclusion from evaluation of “aliens ineligible to citizenship and their descendants”: 
Asians, generally, descendants of enslaved immigrants, and descendants of 
American aborigines. As Roger Daniels noted of such a bureaucratic racial clause: 
“If anyone requires evidence that Congress regarded the United States as a ‘white 
man’s country,’ this clause—subdivision ‘d’ of Section 11 of the Immigration Act 
of 1924—provides it.” 28
The estimates—for there could be little precision, particularly as various 
nationalities had intermarried—included 41.3 million persons of colonial stock 
and 53.5 million of postcolonial stock. Nearly all colonial stock was said to have 
originated in northern and western Europe, 77 percent being of British origin. 
27  See Kevin Yuill, “In the Shadow of the 1924 Immigration Act: FDR, Immigration and Race,” and 
Guest Editor’s Introduction in “Immigration, Race and the US Federal Government: Special Edition,” 
Immigrants and Minorities 32, Issue 2 (2014), 183–205.
28  Rogers, Guarding the Golden Door, 55.
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Of the postcolonial or immigrant stock, 65 percent originated in northern and 
western Europe and 27 percent in southern and eastern Europe. The total of the 
estimates for colonial and postcolonial stock was used in establishing the national 
origins of the white population. The first proclamation establishing quotas on a 
national-origins basis was made by President Herbert Hoover on March 22, 1929, 
and put into effect July 1, 1929. 29
The act immediately restricted immigration and shut down discussion of the 
act’s national origins basis for decades. Net immigration slowed considerably in 
the years after the act took effect on June 30, 1924. Walter F. Wilcox, writing in 
1930, recorded the annual net migration slowing from 662,357 (total immigration 
706,896) in 1924 to 232,945 in 1925. 30 It did not rise above 280,000 and even 
dropped to negative levels for some years during the Great Depression. The low 
point of immigration was at the height of the Depression, when 23,068 people 
immigrated to the United States. The number did not rise above 100,000 until after 
the Second World War. 31
However, an analysis of immigration subsequent to the 1924 Immigration Act 
shows that it did not achieve its aims of balancing immigration in favor of so-
called “Nordic” immigration. About one-half of the anticipated northern and 
western European immigration came to the United States, and nearly twice the 
proportion of southern and eastern European immigration desired by Congress. 
The proportion of western hemisphere immigration was five times higher than 
contemplated in the plan. 32 
After the passage of the 1924 act, particularly after the national origins formula was 
put in place in 1929, it was barely discussed and, rather curiously from the perspective 
of today, almost unquestioned. As Aristide Zolberg observed, “[a]lbeit hardly a part 
of the Constitution, it [the 1924 Immigration Act] had swiftly taken on an aura of 
legitimacy seldom achieved by ordinary legislation, as representing the American 
people’s inviolable determination no longer to be a nation of immigrants.” 33
29  Ibid.
30  Walter F. Wilcox, “Immigration into the United States,” in Walter F. Wilcox, ed., International 
Migrations, Volume II: Interpretations (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Economic Research, 
1931), 85–122. Bennett, American Immigration Policies, 60.
31  Mark V. Siegler, An Economic History of the United States: Connecting the Present with the Past, 
(London: Palgrave, 2017), 318.
32  Bennett, American Immigration Policies, 54–55.
33 Aristide R. Zolberg, A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy and the Fashioning of America 
(London: Harvard University Press, 2006), 291. 
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The Debate in 1923–1924
The debate in Congress in 1921 foreshadowed the discussion in 1924. The prime mover 
of restriction was Representative Albert Johnson, who had pursued a campaign against 
all things alien:  political and religious dissidents, as well as the Japanese. However, in 
1921 Johnson directed his fire at “Bolshevists and anarchists” arriving at Ellis Island, 
importing their European conflicts. 34 Raising the issue of race was left to maverick 
Democratic Senator James A. Reed of Missouri, a distant cousin of Senator David Reed, 
who was almost alone arguing for fewer restrictions on European immigration. James 
Reed argued against “the proposition that, because a human being happens to be born 
in some other country, he is therefore a menace to this Republic.” But the Japanese and 
Chinese “ought to be excluded because of racial differences.” Had immigration of the 
“great white races” of Europe not occurred in the 19th century, he wondered “whether 
there would have been many more white men in this country than there are colored 
people at the present hour.” 35 Reed introduced an amendment to the 1917 Immigration 
bill that would have prevented anyone with African ancestry from entering the country. 36
The EQA was renewed in 1922 until June 30, 1924. Calvin Coolidge reminded Congress 
of the issue in his first annual message of December 6, 1923: “America must be kept 
American. For this purpose, it is necessary to continue a policy of restricted immigration. 
It would be well to make such immigration of a selective nature . . . and based either on a 
prior census or upon the record of naturalization.” 37 Congress, however, was reluctant to 
face the issue. There was little ground given between a strongly restrictionist committee 
in the House and a Senate committee inclined to listen to big business and others who 
wanted a more liberal policy. As one pundit put it in March 1923: “Congress has gone 
home without adopting an immigration policy.” 38 But as the 65th Congress took its place 
in November 1923, the issue could be put off no longer. The EQA was due to expire in 
June 1924. Disputes certainly characterized the discussion, despite the slight wariness 
with which the debates were sometimes conducted and despite, as one historian has 
claimed, that “surprisingly little” debate occurred. 39
34  Speech of Hon. Albert Johnson of Washington in the House of Representatives, Friday, January 
14, 1921, Congressional Record, Vol. 60, Part 5, 4379.
35  Speech of Senator James A. Reed, May 3 1921, Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 
61, 949, 952.
36  Speech of Senator James A. Reed, February 5 1917, Congressional Record, 64th Cong. 2nd Sess., 
Vol. 54, 2317.
37 The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29564 
(accessed July 5, 2017).
38  Ruth Crawford, “Standing pat on the quota law,” Survey, March 15, 1923, 771–72.
39  Christina Anne Ziegler-McPherson, “Emanuel Celler/Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965,” in 
Patrick J. Hayes, ed. The Making of Modern Immigration: An Encyclopedia of People and Ideas (Oxford: ABC-
Clio, 2012): 198–201, 186.
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Albert Johnson had been appointed chair of the House Immigration and 
Naturalization Committee—which was under the influence of infamous red-baiter 
A. Mitchell Palmer—largely for his attacks on political radicals. 40 Johnson had 
been “much impressed” with The Passing of the Great Race. 41 But his scattergun 
approach to restriction alienated many on Capitol Hill. 
Both sides began to rally support. The Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States, through its committee on immigration, suggested the addition of a super-
quota of two percent, making a total of five percent, to be chosen on the basis of 
selective tests and in view of specific labor needs. However, by this time restriction 
was “firmly in the saddle.” Unions consistently argued for restriction on the 
basis that their members would face less competition. After the Red Scare, and 
as unemployment rose after the war, manufacturers couched their requests for 
labor with demands that it was “patriotically American,” and avoided what they 
characterized as the “alien hordes” of pre-war immigration. 42
What were then called “minority influences”—such as humanitarian and 
internationalist groups on the manufacturers’ side and the Ku Klux Klan and 
eugenicists on the restrictionists’ side—rose in prominence in the months 
preceding the act’s passage. Often, though, the testimony resolved little. The 
eugenics testimony of expert Harry Laughlin to the Immigration and Naturalization 
Committee dealt less with differences between national origins and more with 
preventing breeding by “social inadequates,” lending itself to generalized eugenic 
measures rather than national origin restrictions. 43 
Much more than in 1917 or 1921, the Nordic inferiority/superiority debate captivated 
the public and Congress in 1924, as congressional debates and newspapers at the 
time attest, despite the confused nature of the evidence presented. A resolution 
introduced in December 1922 by Republican Congressman John L. Cable asked why, 
since “scientific research has brought to perfection certain methods for measuring 
mental capacity known as intelligence tests,” they could not be used at Ellis Island. 
Dr. Robert M. Yerkes, of the National Research Council, who directed the first 
40  See Kristofer Allerfeldt, Race, Radicalism, Religion and Restriction: Immigration in the Pacific 
Northwest, 1890–1924 (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003), 216.
41  Higham, Strangers in the Land, 313.
42  Crawford, “Standing pat on the quota law,” 772.
43  Statement of Harry H. Laughlin, Hearings of the Committee of Immigration and Naturalization, 
113. As Laughlin commented in 1921, “Apparently, the quality of our immigration is declining. It is not 
so much a matter of nationality—that is, northern European blood against southern European blood—
as of skimmed milk versus cream in each of the countries sending us immigrants.”
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Intelligence Quotient (IQ) tests in the U.S. army during the war, frankly admitted 
that no scientific methods had yet successfully measured racial differences. 44
The Debates:  the “New Immigration” and Insulting Japan
The debates before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization in 
1923 and 1924 centered upon “New Immigration,” particularly concerning the use 
of the 1890 census as the baseline for restrictions. Later, the Japanese Exclusion 
Clause dominated. Some ardent restrictionists wanted the 1890 census—which 
was the proposed temporary basis for restrictions under the 1924 act until the 
national origins clause became operable—to instead become the permanent 
basis for restriction. Others wanted a complete end to immigration. 45 Many more 
protested their perceived unfairness in the proposed restrictions to southern and 
eastern Europeans. The American Federation of Labor (AFL), the American Legion, 
patriotic societies, and the IRL lined up in favour of the two percent quotas. Not all, 
however, backed race discrimination. The AFL, the largest lobbying force, advocated 
temporary suspension of all immigration, urging Congress in 1921 and again in 1922 
to “forbid the importation of labor from any country until such time as conditions 
in our country become stabilized and relations of life more normal.” 46 Many in the 
AFL, according to the secretary of state, opposed racial categories altogether. 47
Opponents of the bill ceded ground, particularly in regard to radicalism but later 
on the importance of racial homogeneity. A minority of the House committee 
disagreed with Johnson’s bill. In its hearings, Representatives Isaac Siegel, Adolph 
Sabath, and Robert Mahoney, who attacked the two percent plan, were careful to 
voice their enthusiastic approval of the purpose of previous immigration efforts. 
They argued for the welfare of refugees, the interests of manufacturers in securing 
cheap labor, and the hurt of Americans from eastern and southern Europe who 
felt their heritage was being belittled. 48 Louis S. Gottlieb, vice president of the 
44  Ibid.
45  Democratic Senator William J. Harris of Georgia, for instance, submitted an amendment to the 
1924 bill that would have prevented any immigration for five years. The amendment was rejected 36–16. 
Senator James Thomas Heflin, also a strong supporter of immigration restriction, tried unsuccessfully 
to amend the legislation on April 18 to restrict all immigration for two years. Congressional Record, 
Senate, April 16, 1924, 6473, 6644. 
46 Minority Report of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization of the House of 
Representatives, presented by Adolph Sabath and Samuel Dickstein, Reel 78, No. 133, Immigration–
Department of Labor, Calvin Coolidge Papers, Library of Congress, 28.
47  Letter from Frank Kellog, Secretary of State, to President Coolidge dated July 21, 1927, Reel 79, 
DoL Immigration, Series 1, Calvin Coolidge Papers, Library of Congress.
48  Restriction of immigration, Hearings before the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 
House of Representatives, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., on H.R.5, H.R.101, H.R.561 [H.R.6540].
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Selective Immigrant Aid Society in Washington, argued that the present laws were 
sufficient and objected to the implications of racial inequality in the proposed 
1924 Immigration Act. Johnson questioned Gottlieb at length about Jewish 
connections, asking about the vice president of the organization, “Is he a Jew?” 49
All agreed that dangerous agitators must be prevented from entering the 
country. The National Committee on Constructive Immigration Legislation, 
with a membership that was overwhelmingly liberal on immigration, 50 for 
instance, argued in 1920 for a “wise regulation of immigration” that will prevent 
“unemployment, unrest and class conflict, conditions which provide the fertile soil 
for the propagation of Bolshevism.” 51 The New York Times noted in an editorial on 
December 3, 1920: “The protection of the country from the revolutionaries and 
radicals eager to descend upon it is one essential object of a general immigration 
law.” 52 
But another important source for consensus urged that races should be separated. 
Mr. William Edlin, an editor and chairman of United Foreign-Language Newspaper 
Publishers and Editors of New York, who testified before the Immigration and 
Naturalization Committee, strongly resisted strictures on Eastern and Southern 
Europeans. But when asked by a member of the committee if that included 
Chinese and Japanese, he replied “I do not want to take in those races which do 
not assimilate readily.” Echoing Senator James Reed’s sentiments expressed in the 
1921 debate, Edlin noted that though he had “high regard” for the Japanese, he 
favored a law for their exclusion. Another testifying to the Committee on behalf 
of Assyrians protested that “these people are not Asiatic. . . . They are of a higher 
type.” 53
49  Restriction of Immigration, 52.
50  Jeremiah Jenks, Hamilton Holt, W.W. Husband, Franklin Giddings, George Kennan, Charles 
R. Towson, Herbert Parsons, John Collier, Charles Stelze, and Sidney Gulick. Gulick was clearly the 
driving force behind the Committee, however. Records of the U.S. House of Representatives, Record 
Group 233, HR66A F18.2, Box 486, National Archives Building, Washington, DC.
51  Ibid.
52  “Immigration,” New York Times, December 3, 1920 [editorial]. The same paper published articles 
decrying the idea of Nordic superiority. See, for example, Remsen Crawford, “New Immigration Net: 
How Other Causes Have Anticipated Effect of the Dillingham Act. The New Law. Need of an Object 
Lesson. These Who Are Barred. The New Restrictions, New York Times, July 10, 1921.
53  Restriction of Immigration: Hearings, 373–74. Statement of Reverend E. W. McDowell of Wooster, 
Ohio, 774. Even the inveterate defender of Japanese rights Sidney Gulick admitted the racial differences 
when he called for “rigid restriction of immigration of peoples so diverse from us as are the Japanese, 
Chinese, and Hindus.” Gulick, Sidney Lewis, American Democracy and Asiatic Citizenship (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1918), 93.
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In the past, the need for diplomacy overcame the racial concerns of Californians 
and others on the west coast about the “invasion” of Japanese. President Theodore 
Roosevelt sided with the Japanese in the 1906 San Francisco School Crisis. 54 But the 
newly emerging consensus that race would be the best basis for immigration restriction 
could not tolerate admission of any Japanese. The Japanese certainly understood the 
racial implications of the exclusion clause. Japan had objected strongly that they were 
not given a quota and thus were not equal to European immigrants. A militaristic 
paper, the Yoruza Ohoho, hinted at war, and the milder, more moderate papers called 
the move “a demonstration of unfriendliness.” 55 A militaristic publication in Japan 
declared that the Japanese exclusion clause was neither a simple immigration question 
nor an economic question, but was rather “part of a racial struggle.” 56 
Press Responses Around the Country
Many in the press were initially neutral about the Japanese, particularly sections 
of the press in the south and midwest. As one midwest editor noted: “We cannot 
see our way clear to ‘whoop it up against the yellows.’” 57 Though southern states 
had generally accepted the racial arguments of westerners on the grounds of states’ 
rights against federal interference, the Clarion-Ledger of Jackson, Mississippi, 
attacking the pending immigration bill, indicates some of the contemporary 
confusion and different regional perspectives on the issue of race. Referring to the 
Japanese (indicating the confusion about who was white), it said: “This country 
needs 50m white immigrants of the right kind and ought to have them.” 58
Of the national papers, the Washington Post was strongly supportive of Japanese 
exclusion: “The decision of Congress to exclude Japanese immigrants from the 
United States cannot fail to be supported by the people,” though it noted that 
54  On October 11, 1906, the San Francisco school board passed a resolution demanding that all 
“Chinese, Japanese or Korean children” were to be sent to the Oriental public school. The move was 
specifically aimed at Japanese pupils; Chinese pupils already attended this school. The move outraged 
the Japanese community in San Francisco, who refused to comply with the order and contacted the 
press in Japan. Roosevelt sided with Japan, warning Congress of the “gravest consequences” of the 
school board’s action, which he called a “wicked absurdity.” See Thomas A. Bailey, Theodore Roosevelt 
and the Japanese-American Crises: An Account of the International Complications Arising from the Race 
Problem on the Pacific Coast (Stanford University, CA: Stanford University Press, 1934), 98–99.
55  See “Jingo Tokio Paper Hints of ‘War.’ New York Times, April 17, 1924, 5. “JAPANESE CABINET 
APPROVES PROTESTS: Upholds Matsui’s Conduct of the . . .,” New York Times, April 23, 1924, 23.
56  Izumi Hirobe, Japanese Pride, American Prejudice: Modifying the Exclusion Clause of the 1924 
Immigration Act (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 24.
57  T. R. Ybarra, “Country’s Views On Japanese,” New York Times, June 19, 1921, 71.
58  Arthur Brisbane, “Older than 12000 years, Immigrants Build Greatness” Clarion-Ledger (Jackson, 
Mississippi), January 3, 1924, 3.
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“the American people prefer that this question should not arise.” 59 The New York 
Times, having rejected the literacy tests before the war, wavered and then finally 
became a strong supporter of the 1924 Immigration Act, though it published 
many articles critical of the act. It remained hostile to the “influence of the Ku 
Klux Klan,” which had advocated quotas for “countries that annually send large 
bodies of Jews and Catholics to the United States.” 60 Typifying liberal attacks 
on the exclusion clause, the Times underlined the need for segregation between 
Americans and “Orientals” but insisted that the Gentlemen’s Agreement was the 
best path forward. “Fortunately, Japan understands this [the need for separation] 
fully. She has helped us to keep her people out of the United States during the last 
fifteen years. She recognizes that the two races cannot mix. She admits our right 
to regulate immigration as we see fit.” 61 But, advocating for the act, the editorial 
showed the paper to be the voice of the elite: “The true question is not one of 
‘superior’ or ‘inferior’ races, but of the homogeneity of the American people.” 62
Albert Johnson and David Reed
Representative Albert Johnson, a Republican from Washington, chairman of the 
House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization since 1919, and elected 
president of the Eugenics Research Council in 1923, is often credited for winning 
the day for “The Nordic Victory.” Johnson received praise after the passage of the 
1924 act, and he was not shy of accepting the accolades. Typical is contemporary 
Frank L. Babbot’s assessment that “few congressmen have ever rendered more 
important service.” 63 Historians have followed contemporary accounts, seemingly 
in an anxious search for a villain in the piece. For instance, Roger Daniels called 
Albert Johnson the “chief author” of the 1924 act and does not mention his 
senatorial counterpart, David Aiken Reed.  64 Certainly, many authors see Johnson’s 
59  “Japanese Exclusion,” Washington Post, April 15, 1924, 6.
60 “Immigration Bill Taken Up in House: Party Lines Are Forgotten as Representative Johnson 
Presents Contentious Measure. City Members Eight Bill While Members From South and West Are 
Strongly Supporting Proposed Restrictions,” New York Times, April 6, 1924.
61  “Finding a Way Out,” New York Times, April 29, 1924.
62  Later the same month, the Times noted about the need to racially restrict Asians: “This objection, it 
cannot be sufficiently emphasized, does not rest on any imagined superiority of the white race, but solely on 
the incompatibility of the different racial standards.” “Asiatics in America,” New York Times, April 27, 1924.
63  Cited in Jonathan Spiro, Defending the Master Race, 233.
64 Desmond King emphasised the centrality of Johnson in crafting and pushing through the 
legislation, seeing him as the “link between eugenicists’ research and immigration policy-making.” 
Making Americans: Immigration, Race, and the Origins of the Diverse Democracy (London: Harvard 
University Press, 2000). See also Daniels, Guarding the Golden Door, 55. Tom Gjelten also emphasises 
Johnson’s key role in A Nation of Nations: The Great American Immigration Story (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2016), 88. See also Hans P. Vought, The Bully Pulpit and the Melting Pot: American Presidents 
and the Immigrant, 1897–1933 (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2004). 
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racialized vision of the United States—one he adopted from the racial theories 
of Madison Grant, Lothrop Stoddard, and others—as a perspective that the 1924 
Immigration Act encompassed. 65 
Johnson was consistent in his efforts at restricting immigration. He had introduced 
an immigration bill to the House of Representatives in August 1919 and was the 
force behind the EQA in 1921. As a representative from Washington, he expressed 
hostility toward Japanese immigration, but he encountered barriers to his 
ambitions of a restrictive bill. The IRL, sensitive to Japan’s complaints of blatant 
discrimination, initially opposed Johnson’s 1919 bill, choosing to support others 
put forward by Senators Thomas Sterling and William Paul Dillingham. After 
Sidney Gulick expressed support for the latter bills, those hostile to the Japanese 
gathered around Johnson, and the other bills failed to gain traction. Some scholars 
go so far as to argue that passage of the EQA was due less to the political power of 
Albert Johnson than to the unpopularity of Gulick, who had lobbied hard for the 
alternative bills. 66
Johnson and his allies incorporated the arguments of John Bond Trevor, a lawyer 
and son of a prominent financier, who became active in the fight for immigration 
restriction and who was, according to John Higham, in Madison Grant’s circle. 67 
Trevor was also a crucial proponent of immigration restrictions as a credible and 
practicable means of protecting the United States from Bolshevism. Not long after 
the EQA became law, Trevor helped argue that the EQA, based as it was on the 
numbers of foreign-born of various nationalities in 1910, was prejudicial to northern 
and western European immigrants because it ignored the native-born, the majority 
of whom were from northern and western Europe. The Johnson bill would restore 
the racial balance of the country. Of course, for maintaining, as Trevor put it, the 
“racial preponderance,” the bill made sense. 68
Few credit the other author of the Johnson-Reed Act, Senator David A. Reed, for his 
role in passage of the act, though his amendments to the House bill made it palatable 
to the Senate and ensured that in the long term the 1890 census—unfair to those from 
65  Kristofer Allerfeldt has Johnson as more nuanced on such issues. See Kristofer Allerfeldt “’And 
We Got Here First’: Albert Johnson, National Origins and Self-Interest in the Immigration Debate of 
the 1920s,” Journal of Contemporary History 45, No. 1 (January 2010): 7–26.
66  Son Thierry Ly and Patrick Weil, “The Antiracist Origin of the Quota System” Social Research 77, 
No 1 (Spring 2010).
67  Higham, Strangers in the Land, 321.
68  John B. Trevor, “Preliminary Study of Immigration Problem” in 68th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional 
Record, 5469. 
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eastern and southern Europe—was replaced by a much more comprehensive survey 
based on the 1920 census. The perfect foil for Johnson, Reed was born December 21, 
1880, to Federal Judge James H. Reed and Katherine J. Aiken Reed in Pittsburgh. He 
attended Shady Side private school—“an institution for the nurturing of millionaires’ 
sons”—and drew upon his connections to the most powerful businessman of his day, 
Andrew Mellon, with whom he was familiar enough, according to one article, to call 
“Uncle Andy.” 69 After attending Princeton, he served as a lawyer and became leader 
of the Pittsburgh bar. Though he clearly represented Pittsburgh’s elite—defending 
the United States Steel Corporation from antitrust charges, his liberality and 
independence of mind led him to support workmen’s compensation, and he drew up 
the Workmen’s Compensation Act. As such, there is little evidence of his racial views 
before he entered Congress, though when he spoke to a predominantly black audience 
in 1927 he criticised “narrow-minded” Americans and called for African-Americans 
to be allowed into the University of Pittsburgh. 70 After service in the First World War, 
Reed chaired the Industrial Accidents Committee and became vice president of the 
Pennsylvania bar until, as a reward from “Uncle Andy,” he was appointed Republican 
senator in 1922, winning a full-term in November of that year. 71
69  William C. Murphy, Jr, “Senator Reed,” The North American Review 231, No. 5 (May 1931): 
419–27.
70  “Senator Reed Speaks,” The Pittsburgh Courier, January 8, 1927, 1.
71 “Pittsburgh Man Saw Service With American Army in France,” (Philadelphia) Evening 
Public Ledger, March 29, 1922; “Corporation News,” Harrisburg Telegraph, December 2, 1915, 16; 
“Compensation Up to Special Committee,” Harrisburg Telegraph, April 23, 1919, 5; “‘Blue Sky’ Bill Laid 
Over For More Study,” Harrisburg Telegraph, June 5, 1919, 9.
Senator David Reed intended the 1924 Immigration Act to ensure that “the racial composition of 
America at the present is made permanent.”
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As a senator at the beginning of 1923, Reed introduced a bill designed to stimulate 
immigration from northern Europe. Reed’s bill, mirroring the suggestions of the 
Chamber of Congress’s Committee on Immigration, sought to raise the three 
percent immigration quota law in the EQA to five percent, but he insisted that 
it be based not upon the 1910 but on the 1890 census. Reed soon found himself 
thrust into leadership of immigration matters in the Senate due to the death of 
Senator William Paul Dillingham in July 1923. Dillingham had long held up the 
liberal wing of restrictionism against Johnson’s open embrace of theories of racial 
superiority and inferiority, having even proposed quotas for Chinese and Japanese 
immigrants. Reed took over as author of the bill in the Senate when Senator 
LeBaron Colt of Rhode Island, chair of the Senate Immigration Committee, was 
unwilling and partially unable because of illness. 
Reed’s role in the 1924 legislation was to insist upon racial lines being drawn 
around national origins but doing so by adopting ameliorative language. Reed’s 
views echoed those of the Inter-Racial Council, a liberal body organized in 1919 
by “industrial and racial leaders to carry on the racial adjustments and educational 
work begun under governmental direction,” 72 and liberal organs like the New 
York Times. He employed a new diplomatic language to justify racial borders; 
difference—not superiority—became the new watchword. Certainly, Reed was 
far removed from the vitriolic racism of Johnson. He declared to the Senate that 
“every Russian is the equivalent of myself in terms of desirability, and the same for 
every Pole and every Syrian and every Italian; they are all just as good as I am.” 73 
Later in the same discussion, he also directly contradicted Nordicism:
I do not think that this matter of immigration can be discussed by making 
comparisons between the relative merits of this race and that. I do not believe 
we will get anywhere if we legislate on the theory that that this nation is superior 
to that . . . That gets us nowhere but into a turmoil of resentment and racial and 
national jealousy. 74
In March 1924 Reed introduced an amendment that removed the taint of 
discrimination against southern and eastern Europeans by creating, in the 
long-term, a commission that would ultimately study the national origins of 
Americans in 1920—alleviating the complaint that basing it on the 1890 census 
discriminated against those from the east and south of Europe. It received 
72  The Inter-Racial Council [Pamphlet] (New York: The Inter-Racial Council, 1919).
73  Debate in Senate on S.2576, April 2, 1924, Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 65, 5468.
74  Ibid.
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support from Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, the veteran anti-immigration 
campaigner who served on the Immigration Committee in the Senate from 1895 
to 1917. 75 In April, Reed, arguing for his amendment, seized upon John Trevor’s 
point. “[W]hat I want is to end the discrimination against the American born,” 
Reed intoned. 76
Reed made it clear that, rather than a belief in racial equality, he was inspired by 
the need to avoid racial conflict. “I think it is no exaggeration to say that three or 
four years ago the military people in Japan and the military people in our country 
expected a war between the two countries in the not far distant future,” he warned 
when initially opposing the zero-quota for Japan. 77 In response to a question about 
African immigration on April 9, Reed replied: “No one wants a quota from Africa 
of that type of immigration. So our calculations deal only with the whites.” When 
asked about the West Indies, he said: “We want to hold down the immigration that 
has begun to spring up among the negroes of the West Indies.” 78
Reed, speaking for many hours and seldom refusing a question, patiently shepherded the 
bill past the many barriers that immigration bills had faced over the previous 20 years. 
His aim was to get agreement around a national origins amendment to the Johnson bill:
I believe that the American people are as nearly agreed on restricting immigration 
as they are on any other single issue that is now being discussed; and if we are 
agreed that immigration must be restricted, then obviously it becomes of critical 
importance that we decide what method of restriction we are to use. 79 
Reed’s answer to his own question was race, or as he preferred to call it, national 
origins. His flexibility and willingness to compromise led toward a definition 
of American citizenship as essentially racial even while he insisted otherwise. 
Through loyalty to his business backers he had called for five percent quotas but 
75  Debate in the Senate on S.2576, April 9, 1924, 5508.
76  Debate in the Senate on S.2576, April 3, 1924, 5468.
77  Debate in the Senate on S.2576, April 9, 1924, 5944. Reed clearly had an interest in dealing with 
Japan that he was to develop later. At the London Naval Conference in 1930 he served as “the active 
agent in conversations with the Japanese,” and the prevention of Japanese parity on naval ships was 
largely the work of Reed. Conyers Read, “More Light on the London Naval Treaty of 1930,” Proceedings 
of the American Philosophical Society 93, No. 4 (September 9, 1949), 290–308, 300.
78  Debate in the Senate on S.2576, April 9, 1924, Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 
65, 5944, 5945.
79  Debate in the Senate on S.2576, April 2, 1924, Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 
65, 5468, 5467.
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had been an early adopter of the 1890 census as a basis for future immigration, 
employing John Trevor’s justification for it. Some at the time recognized the 
significance of the amendment, despite Reed’s lawyerly obfuscation. Senator 
Colt warned, disapprovingly: “There is another idea that strikes a good many 
with considerable force—and the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania has 
an amendment to that effect—that is, to base the quota upon racial groups.” 80 
Reed instead insisted that his amendment sought restriction based on national 
origins rather than race. 81 He expressed impatience with the seemingly intractable 
discussions in the Senate:  “If we once got into a study of the ethnology involved in 
this question, we could not pass an immigration law in the next 50 years, because 
we would not ever be satisfied with the product.” 82
The Hanihara Incident
The Senate Immigration Committee had unanimously rejected Johnson’s 
Japanese exclusion clause. 83 However, the Japanese government filed a 
vigorous protest on April 10, 1924, against the prohibition of Japanese in 
the immigration bill passed by the House. Mansanao Hanihara, the Japanese 
ambassador, pointed out that the “manifest object of the said section 12b (13c 
in act) 84 is to single out Japanese as a nation, stigmatizing them as unworthy 
and undesirable.” Hanihara noted that what he asked for would only result in 
146 more Japanese immigrants per year. 85 
Hanihara’s letter became the turning point for the discussion. Secretary of 
State Charles E. Hughes speedily agreed with the Japanese contention, directly 
challenging the section of the House bill, which prompted discussion on the floors 
of both houses for and against his action. Hughes was certainly not alone in his 
80  Ibid., 5412.
81  Ibid., 5468.
82  Ibid., 5462.
83  Ibid.. 5475.
84  This contentious section read “No alien ineligible for citizenship shall be admitted to the United 
States . . .” See Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922). In 1915, Takao Ozawa, a Japanese 
citizen who had lived in the United States for 20 years, filed for U.S. citizenship under the Naturalization 
Act of 1906, which allowed only “persons of African nativity or persons of African descent” or “free 
white persons.” Ozawa argued that Japanese persons were whiter than Portuguese and other groups 
allowed citizenship. Because the Supreme Court held that Japanese were not white or African, they 
were ineligible for citizenship according to the 1906 Naturalization Act. See also Ian F. Haney-López, 
White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race (New York: New York University Press, 1996).
85  M. Hanihara and Charles E. Hughes, “The Hughes-Hanihara Letters,” Advocate of Peace through 
Justice 86, No. 5 (May 1924): 309–12.
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contentions. 86 However, those pushing for a strictly racial immigration bill seized 
upon one phrase in Hanihara’s letter—“grave consequences”—and presented it 
as an implied threat to the nation, to the democratic will of Congress. Outrage 
followed in the national news media. 87 Undoubtedly, those who had not wanted 
to offend Japan felt that they had to defend Congress against foreign interference. 
Lodge, the Republican floor leader and chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, 
tried to focus discussion on Japanese exclusion “in secret legislative session,” a proposal 
seconded by Reed. 88 Whereas there are no records of this meeting, recent scholars echo 
the sentiment of Hughes’ biographer Merlo Pusey in 1951: “It is unbelievable that any 
substantial number of Senators were really concerned about the alleged ‘threat.’” As 
Misuzu Hanihara Chow and Kiyofuku Chuma argue, some senators officially “wished 
to avoid having racial segregation written into law” but were “given a way out” by the 
phrase. 89 In any case, Lodge and Reed took advantage of the Hanihara letter issue and 
reversed their earlier position of agreement with Hughes. On April 14, Reed argued: 
Now, however, Mr President—and I am speaking only for myself in this—I 
think the situation has changed. I think it ceases to be a question whether 
this is a deplorable method of restricting Japanese immigration. The letter of 
the Japanese Ambassador puts the unpleasant burden upon us of deciding 
whether we will permit our legislation to be controlled by apprehensions of 
“grave consequences” with other nations if we do not follow a particular line of 
legislative conduct. I, for one, feel compelled, on account of that veiled threat, to 
vote in favor of the exclusion and against the committee amendment.” 90
86  Edward D. Robbins, a prominent lawyer, wrote to Coolidge on April 24, 1924: “I have met no one 
whose opinion is likely to be influential, who does not seriously regret the action of Congress. There 
is a general feeling of all persons who have given any thought to Pacific problems that this clumsy, 
roughhouse method of alienating the friendship of the Japanese people is likely to be fraught with 
great evils to this country in our pursuit of a sound and sensible Pacific policy adequately protecting 
what promises to be immense American interests in the future.” Letter from Edward D. Robbins to 
Calvin Coolidge, April 24, 1924, in Calvin Coolidge Papers, Reel 92, No. 197, Japan Gov & Embassy, 
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87  See, for instance, “Japanese Protest Further Exclusion,” New York Times, April 12, 1924.
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Th e Senate agreed to the amendment with the 
two percent formula and the absolute prohibition 
of Japanese or other immigration that did not fit 
in with the naturalization rules. Those who had 
not wanted to offend the Japanese but wished to 
remove the possibility of racial problems within 
the United States drew a line firmly through the 
Pacific. Among the differences with Johnson’s 
bill, the two per cent quota applied only for 
three years. Thereafter, Johnson’s amendment 
would apply, with the national origins quotas 
to be determined according to the composition 
of the population of the country as a whole in 
1920 rather than by the number of foreign-born 
in 1890. The Johnson-Reed Immigration Quota 
Act passed in both houses of Congress with 
overwhelming majorities:  308–58 in the House, and 69–9 in the Senate. A Senate 
and House Joint Committee was set up to harmonize the bills.
The offense to the Japanese still haunted the proceedings. Immediately, 
internationally minded Americans urged President Coolidge to veto the legislation. 
Many, from pioneering social worker Jane Addams to the New York Times, 
implored him to do so to remove the insult the Japanese felt after the act’s passage. 
A letter signed by 30 college presidents condemned the “inconsiderate action” of 
Congress. The Commonwealth Club of California, made up of businessmen and 
professionals, condemned the vote as an “international blunder.” The Japanese 
maintained reasonable hopes that Coolidge would use his veto power. Coolidge 
refused, signing the bill into law on May 26, 1924. 91 
The historiography often emphasizes Coolidge’s reluctance to sign the bill. 92 Some 
suggest that Coolidge objected to the anti-Japanese clause on diplomatic grounds 
but had little choice but to sign the bill in an election year. 93 Coolidge distanced 
himself from the exclusion provision, saying he would separate it from the rest of the 
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Most liberals backed the 1924 
Immigration Act.
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bill, which he “heartily approved.” If 
the exclusion provision stood alone, 
“I would disprove it.” 94 However, 
there is evidence of an early adoption 
of racial thinking by Coolidge. 
As vice president–elect, he wrote 
an article for Good Housekeeping 
magazine in which he warned: 
“There are racial considerations too 
grave to be brushed aside for any 
sentimental reasons. Biological laws 
tell us that certain divergent people 
will not mix or blend.” 95
Conclusion
In the period in between its passage 
and Coolidge signing the bill into law, David Reed wrote a remarkable New York 
Times article explaining the meaning of the bill. It marked, he said accurately, “a 
new departure in the American attitude” on race and immigration. The purposes 
of the bill, he assured critics, was to recognize that America was no longer “a desert 
country in need of reinforcements” but also to realize that “the races of men who 
have been coming to us are wholly dissimilar to native-born Americans” and that 
they were “untrained in self-government.” The purpose was to ensure that “the 
racial composition of America at the present is made permanent.” Reed finished 
the article with a flurry: 
In my opinion, no law passed by Congress within the last half century compares 
with this one. In its importance upon the future development of our nation. Its 
adoption means that America of our grandchildren will be a vastly better place 
to live in. It will mean a more homogeneous nation, more self-reliant, and more 
closely knit by a common purpose and common ideal. 96
Reed was, in some ways, right. The 1924 Immigration Act was hardly questioned for 20 
years and lasted, nearly intact, until 1966. Within those 40 years, the world was divided 
by a line drawn from the along the Caucasus mountains, through Armenia to Syria, and 
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must be kept American” in 1923, signed the Immigration 
Act into law on May 26, 1924.
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through the Mediterranean to the straits of Gibraltar. All within the European enclave 
were welcome to the United States; those outside were not, though, legally, Africans were 
eligible for American citizenship because of the Naturalization Act of 1870. The United 
States maintained a racial definition of desirable immigration and citizenship. When Earl 
G. Harrison resigned as United States commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization 
in 1944, he said that the only country in the world outside the United States that observed 
racial discrimination in matters relating to naturalization was Nazi Germany, “and we all 
agree that this is not very desirable company.” 97
The lines drawn in 1924 also helped to change conceptions of “race,” particularly 
defining “whiteness” more exclusively. In the 1890s, John Wigmore, the famous 
evidence scholar and treatise writer, thought that if the Chinese were not white, the 
Japanese certainly were. 98 But the act slammed the door—if it was at all ajar after 
the Ozawa ruling in 1922—firmly on the possibility of Japanese being grouped 
with European nations. As some observers have noted, what are today thought of 
as European ethnicities were, before the 1924 Immigration Act, often discussed as 
races. 99 This legislation and the period surrounding it surely deserve attention in 
the current discussion about whiteness.
This article highlights the role of liberals in the passage of the 1924 act and argues 
that the drive toward racial categories in 1924 was “top-down.” Historians have long 
mistaken the reticence of liberals about the issue of race for disapproval of the racial 
language and theories behind the 1924 Immigration Act, but their silence reflected 
their different reasons for supporting the act. The patrician IRL had brought attention 
to the racial nightmare—that whites would be supplanted by races who could 
“underlive” them, meaning survive on lower wages. Labor may have been kept awake 
by this nightmare, but their answer to the problems was to restrict all immigration 
rather than apportion it along racial lines. Ardent immigration restrictionists, such as 
Madison Grant and Lothrop Stoddard, feared the loss of control of “Nordics” to other 
European immigrants more, perhaps, than they feared the invasion of those from 
outside Europe. But the upper echelons of American society were clearly motivated by 
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fear of a future race war they were desperate to avoid. By incorporating international 
race anxieties, they defined “whiteness” as Europeanness or Westernness even as they 
studiously avoided discussing it for fear of provoking racial tensions. David Reed, 
representative of the Eastern elite, prioritized preserving the status quo by keeping the 
existing racial makeup of the country, restricting immigration on lines of race above 
the specific percentages involved.
Reed resolutely defended the national origins concept when, in 1928, Herbert 
Hoover declared that he would scrap it upon becoming president because it would 
reduce the numbers of German, Irish, and Norwegian immigrants while raising 
quotas for those from Britain. Hoover was supported by the United States Chamber 
of Commerce as well as several ethnic associations. 100 Reed again won the day; 
upon taking office, Hoover backed down when Reed threatened a filibuster. As the 
New York Times, clearly on Reed’s side, noted: “The truth is that the framers of the 
national origins plan were less interested in English or Irish quotas than they were 
in devising a method that would give representation to the entire white population 
of the United States and that would apportion quotas on an equitable basis.” 101
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